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and Criminal Law
Franklin E. Zimringt
My reactions to Kenneth Mann's original and insightful essay are organized
under four headings. Part I offers a short recital of the academic complaints that
are a compulsory part of this sort of exercise. Part II outlines three different
types of middleground innovations between civil and criminal law and argues
that the type of innovation chosen is a significant element in the calculus of
the due process standards that should be imposed on governmental action. Part
III suggests that the growth of administrative government and the need for
administrative agencies to control their own enforcement agendas are the
dominant reasons for the evolution of punitive civil sanctions at the federal
level. Other factors Professor Mann lists, such as burden of proof and procedur-
al protection for defendants, hold much less significance in explaining the boom
in middleground civil sanctions. Finally, Part IV suggests that as the number
and kind of criminal sanctions expand, the case for allowing punitive civil
remedies rests on the comparative advantage of agency-managed enforcement
efforts.
I. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
Professor Mann's "middleground" article is open-ended to a fault in two
respects: a number of key terms in the article are never defined, and the due
process calculus with which Professor Mann would replace the characterization
of sanctions into the civil or criminal rubric is totally unspecified. At both the
front and back end of his argument, then, Professor Mann leaves too much to
the reader's imagination.
The most striking nondefinition in the article is the argument's central
term--the "punitive civil sanction." Professor Mann fails to define that key
phrase or any of its constituent terms. I take it that the label "civil" applies to
any proceedings so labeled by a legislature. But what is a "sanction"? Any
money collected by government from private parties? Monies or other conse-
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quences due as a result of a breach of duty or promise? Are my annual income
taxes sanctions? What about the interest due if I do not pay my taxes on time?
The percentage penalty the IRS collects for civil fraud? Without a conceptual
definition of the term "sanction," the subject of the article remains unspecified.
The failure to define the term "punitive" further compounds this mystery,
which in turn leads to some waffling about what the author means by "punitive
civil sanction." Early on, he tells us that he will argue for calling all "more-
than-compensatory" money sanctions punitive But the author never fully
defines "compensatory," and his article later speaks as if larger than compensa-
tory monetary transfers may have nonpunitive motivations and justifications. 2
Without any notion of what the author regards as punitive and why he does so,
the distinction between punitive and other types of money sanctions is obscured.
This is particularly confusing because he fails to define the other adjectives
affixed to money sanctions as well. The article includes a lengthy discussion
of what it calls a deterrence rationale in civil cases, and contrasts it with what
it calls punitive sanctions. The distinction is difficult to grasp because the
author defines neither "deterrent" nor "punitive." Is the former only instrumen-
tal and the latter only condemnatory? If so, all real world examples would be
composites of the "ideal types" in Professor Mann's scheme. One who doubts
that punitive and deterrent rationales can be clearly distinguished, as I do, will
not find reassurance in the author's inattention to definition.
The lack of a principled definition of deterrence in Mann's article may also
explain why he allows the jurisprudence of monetary sanctions to paint itself
into the following corner: The idea that these sanctions are deterrent and not
punitive procedures reduces them in size and prevents lawmakers from setting
monetary sanctions at levels that are high enough to exploit the full deterrent
potential of a fully developed regime of monetary sanctions.3 The author cites
no authority for this extraordinary paradox, and my own reading of deterrent
rationalizations points in the opposite direction. Deterrence rationales in crimi-
nal law are notoriously open-ended, always available to justify an escalation
in penalty as long as a harm to be deterred still exists.4 By contrast, theories
of just desert actually may have upper boundaries that are easier to find. But
all this assumes that Professor Mann's definition of deterrence is the same as
that of most other commentators in the field of criminal law. One strand of tort
theory worries about overdeterrence, the reduction of productive noncriminal
behavior below optimal levels.5 In contrast, most literature is unconcerned with
the overdeterrence of bank robbery. Which deterrence doctrine does Professor
1. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101
YALE L. 1795, 1815 (1992).
2. See, e.g., id. at 1823-37.
3. Id. at 1839.
4. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 3. HAWKINs, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME
CONTROL 37-42 (1973).
5. RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 176 (3d ed. 1986).
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Mann have in mind? The article could have brought more order to the confu-
sions now found in case law and academic analysis had it paid more attention
to these definitional niceties.
The second loose end in the article's analysis is the lack of a due process
framework. Professor Mann argues for a functional jurisprudence in which due
process standards governing both the burden of proof and procedural protections
related to privacy and dignity increase in civil cases with the severity of the
6potential consequences. But in his article, this outcome appears as an end
without a means because he does not present the framework he would use to
create such a sliding scale. Once he shows congressional willingness to extend
a low "one size fits all" threshold of civil case protection, some constitutional
standards seem necessary to the establishment of a sliding scale of procedural
protection. But how are we to achieve that protection?
The author justly criticizes the rather arbitrary pattern of bifurcating cases
into civil and criminal categories and of providing high-end due process
protection only to those cases classified as criminal. He also implicitly rejects
a functional jurisprudence that would classify more cases as criminal in nature
and thus use criminal procedure as the method of reaching larger constitutional
protections.
Perhaps it is premature to reject the convenient peg of a civil-criminal
distinction without some attention to alternative constitutional mechanisms
available to structure and justify procedural standards. Heightened protection
in civil cases usually occurs in situations that involve the risk of secure confine-
ment, such as juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction and involuntary civil
commitment under the mental health powers, or the loss of personal associa-
tions, such as child custody.7 Do any of these cases provide a better foundation
for sliding-scale due process standards in civil monetary sanction cases than
the civil-criminal dichotomy? If not, how should a framework be constructed
to support a sliding scale result?
I. MIDDLEGROUND INNOVATIONS
A variety of importantly different middleground sanctioning systems is
evolving in the United States, and the appropriate procedures to govern such
systems might depend on the type of middleground system instituted and on
the motive for its establishment. Three distinctions between types of middle-
ground innovations deserve attention in a discussion of the appropriate legal
treatment of civil sanctions: the distinction between middleground criminal
sanctions and innovative civil sanctions; the distinction between civil sanctions
6. Mann, supra note 1, at 1870-71.
7. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination of parental rights); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment proceeding); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (delinquency
proceeding in juvenile court).
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designed as alternatives to criminal processing and those meant to supplement
the criminal process; and the distinction between administratively delivered and
judicially determined civil sanctions. Understanding this diversity of middle-
grounds clarifies the issues involved in choosing procedural standards for
punitive civil sanctions.
Recently, a diversification in the sanctions available through the criminal
law has paralleled the diversification of civil sanctions. The federal criminal
code of 1984 greatly expanded the range of criminal fines,' and both federal
and state criminal sanctions now include options like restitution, the payment
of some enforcement costs, and reparative remedies such as community ser-
vice.9 This diversification of the criminal sanction is directly relevant to the
expansion of civil sanctions in two ways. First, the development of criminal
sanctions in new directions suggests that the desire to avoid procedural protect-
ions associated with criminal prosecution is not the sole force behind the trend
toward more diversified sanction systems. The same forces are evidently at
work within the criminal justice system.
Second, the increased variety of criminal sanctions alters the opportunity
costs associated with the restriction of civil sanctions. If only civil sanctions
could provide very large money fines, the comparative advantage of large fines
would become part of the argument for supporting the civil sanctioning system.
Once the criminal law catches up with administrative systems in the size and
variety of available money sanctions, the case for a civil system must rest on
considerations other than the types of sanctions available. As a matter of moral
proportionality, it would be perverse to maintain a system in which larger
sanctions are available in civil proceedings than in criminal ones. So it seems
preferable to have a system in which the case for civil proceedings rests on
elements other than the adequacy of available sanctions in criminal cases.
Among civil sanctioning systems lies a very important distinction between
civil mechanisms designed to displace criminal proceedings and civil systems
erected only to supplement the risks and punishments of criminal prosecutions.
Professor Mann seems to assume that civil sanctions function as an alternative
to more vigorous criminal prosecutions.
It lessens the need to use the criminal law to sanction wrongs and
permits a more flexible response to the wrongful conduct... While
the reach of the criminal law has expanded consistently, the availability
of punitive civil sanctions has avoided some of the inflation of criminal
laws that would otherwise have occurred. 0
8. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3571-3572 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
9. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKinney
1992); NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION (1990).
10. Mann, supra note 1, at 1863.
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But does this mean that the federal and state legislators who voted for
broad civil drug forfeiture laws were trying to discourage the criminal prosecu-
tion of drug traffickers? Civil regimes like drug forfeiture" and RICO12 are
meant to be supplements; they add more punishment and deterrence to that
imposed in the criminal process and give law enforcers a second chance at
punishment if the criminal prosecution misses its mark. Any diversion from
criminal prosecution would disappoint most of those who enacted a forfeiture
statute.
Thus, not all middleground systems serve the same function; some supple-
ment criminal sanctions while others provide alternatives to them. Even if many
civil penalty systems divert pressure from criminal prosecutions, others supple-
ment those prosecutions. The effect of civil programs is an empirical question
to which an answer based on generalization from a small number of cases is
particularly hazardous. Whether and when civil sanctions lead to an "attenuated
role of criminal prosecution ' 13 is not yet known but well worth discovering.
Some forms of procedural protection restrict supplementary but not alterna-
tive sanctioning systems. For example, since double jeopardy protections force
a choice between civil and criminal remedies, the law enforcer who simply
wishes to use the civil route as an alternative to criminal prosecution is not
concerned with them. 4 However, double jeopardy restrictions might constrain
supplementary uses of the civil option. In this sense, old-fashioned procedural
devices may provide discriminate protection in modem settings.
The third key distinction between types of middleground sanctions concerns
the degree of sanctioning power held by administrative agencies rather than
courts. In the federal government, regulatory agencies can neither prosecute nor
judge criminal matters. Agencies must persuade U.S. Attorneys or the Depart-
ment of Justice to initiate prosecution. This means that tax fraud must compete
with postal theft and water pollution for the U.S. Attorneys' attention. In
contrast, if the civil regulatory scheme conferred the prosecutorial power on
an administrative agency, that agency could set the agenda. Tax matters would
compete only with other tax matters, not with postal theft. Most civil sanction-
ing systems extend further and also give substantial judicial power to adminis-
trative agencies in such cases. These systems thus confer power on regulatory
agencies to control their own agendas, power that they lack in criminal proceed-
ings.
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
13. Mann, supra note 1, at 1863.
14. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1990) (holding civil penalty barred by double jeopardy
after defendant had been convicted for crime based on same facts). The decision pointedly observed:
"Nothing in today's ruling precludes the Government from seeking the full civil penalty against a defendant
who previously has not been punished for the same conduct, even if the civil sanction imposed is punitive."
Id. at 450.
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The basic appeal of administrative civil proceedings over criminal prosecu-
tion lies not in matters of proof or procedural nicety but in the larger power
of administrative agencies in such cases. In this sense, the growth of civil
punitive sanctions may have much more to do with power distributions among
the branches of government than with the burden of proof or procedural
requirements in criminal cases.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT
The growth of administrative government in the federal system seems to
be both the most important explanation for the historical increase in civil sanc-
tions as well as the most significant issue affecting their future. Professor Mann
attributes some of the growth in civil sanctions to this feature, but I think it is
necessary to emphasize this element when assessing responsibility for the
growth of the civil middleground. The growth of administrative agencies
responsible for regulating a particular subject matter-banks, environmental
protection, or highway safety-generates a tendency to grant authority to
enforce substantive regulatory rules to these specialist agencies. The use of the
criminal sanction lies outside the immediate control of the specialist agency as
a matter of constitutional law and governmental organization: criminal matters
must be tried in Article III courts and must be prosecuted by the Department
of Justice. However, the civil sanction relocates prosecutorial authority and
adjudicatory power in the administrative agency.
The strongest evidence for the dominant role of the growth of the adminis-
trative branch of the federal government in the evolution of these sanctions is
the uneven use of civil sanctions at various levels of American government.
While civil sanctioning systems have exploded in the federal government, this
pattern has no parallel in state or local government. At the state level, civil
sanctions may grow when state administrative agencies develop in the federal
pattern, but without this administrative government there is no structure to
support the civil sanction. In the modem city, even the issuance, adjudication,
and enforcement of parking fines remains within the criminal justice system! s
No other branch of government can absorb this type of function at this level
of government.
This need for administrative structure to foster civil sanctions may lead to
paradoxical statistics on criminal and civil sanctions. Those areas where admin-
istrative governance grows most quickly may also experience a large expansion
in criminal prosecutions over the same time period. This, however, would not
be a decisive rebuttal of Professor Mann's theory that civil sanctions can divert
cases away from criminal processes because the same social changes that
produce more governmental attention may cause the expansion of both civil and
15. 60 C.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 25, 28 (1969 & Supp. 1991).
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criminal cases. Without the civil sanctioning system, the growth in criminal
cases might have been even greater.
Still, if expansions in administrative attention are a prerequisite to growth
in civil sanctions programs, the smart money would bet against any reduction
in criminal complaints as an automatic concomitant of the development of civil
sanctions. The use of civil sanctions as a substitute for criminal prosecutions
depends on either the administrative agency or the U.S. Attorney, the gatekeep-
er of prosecution, declining to press criminal charges because of the civil
alternative. How often and in what circumstances this happens are empirical
questions whose answers may lie in the twentieth-century archives of adminis-
trative government.
Pending clarification of the historical record, it seems prudent to assume
that an increase in civil sanctions usually reflects the judgment that a particular
problem area requires more government regulation than the criminal law can
provide, independent of whether that expanded civil attention reduces the
pressure on the criminal justice system. If that is the historic pattern, one's
enthusiasm for the punitive civil sanction in a particular area will depend
largely on one's view of the desirability of expanded government regulation
in that area.
IV. CONCLUSION
My argument for the centrality of administrative government in the growth
of civil sanctions is partly a logical process of elimination and partly an histori-
cal analysis. Civil sanctions are not inherently better suited to responding to
harmful behavior because any sanctions available to civil processes are also
within the reach of the criminal law. If the comparative advantage of the civil
system were merely a matter of streamlined procedures or easing the burden
of proof, any criminal justice system that depends on plea bargaining could
achieve the same low-cost penalty determinations by exchanging leniency for
procedural rights. It is the capacity of administrative agencies to control civil
sanctions, to bring such systems almost totally within the sphere of administra-
tive control, that seems to be the most important factor in the growth of these
sanctions.
Whether the civil sanction is appropriate then becomes a question of the
optimal scale of governmental regulation. This is a question that Professor
Mann addresses only implicitly, if at all. But if one is ready to conclude that
many modern problems need more government than the criminal law can
provide, what does this mean for the shape of the sanctioning system that
should result?
Without detailing a middleground jurisprudence of my own, two narrow
points and one broader one emerge from the preceding discussion. First, if
procedural shortcuts are not the major advantage of the civil punitive sanction,
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rigorous procedural protections can constrain the sanctioning process without
sacrificing the central comparative advantage of the civil sanction. Second, if
the supplemental civil sanctions available in formats like civil RICO and drug
forfeiture are less important than administrative alternatives to criminal proceed-
ings, perhaps some form of election of remedies can discourage supplemental
proceedings without having a derogatory impact on alternative sanctioning
proceedings.
The broader point illustrated by these possibilities is that it might not be
difficult to accommodate both the interests served by strict rules of procedural
due process and the governmental interests at the core of the trend toward civil
punitive sanctions. Furthermore, the possibility of such an accommodation is
not irrelevant to the prospects for heightened due process protections in civil
punitive sanction cases. The Supreme Court has used the kind of pragmatic
functional analysis that highlights these possibilities to detail due process
requirements in parental rights cases and delinquency proceedings. 16 Perhaps
what is good for Gerald Gault is good for General Motors as well.
16. Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that to guarantee fundamental fairness various
due process requirements must be fulfilled in adjudging delinquency in juvenile court proceedings) with
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (in juvenile proceedings, due process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that act would constitute crime if committed by adult) and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528(1971) (jury trial not constitutionally required in adjudicative phase of juvenile court proceedings).
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